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Summary: The technical solution of on-board unit (OBU) for vehicles used for dangerous good transport and design of 
vehicle sensor network (based on CAN bus) for dangerous good monitoring will be discussed. In presentation the conception 
of GSM/GPRS networking subsystem for real time data transmission into monitoring centre will be described. Next themes 
of discussion will be focused on the possibilities of solution of safety-related communication channel for safety sensor 
network in accordance with standard for functional safety of Electrical / Electronic / Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) 
systems IEC 61508 [4], recommended methods of risk analysis and possibilities of their modelling and proposal of secure 
communication channel over GSM/GPRS for secure data transmission into control centre on the base of IPsec protocol.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The dangerous good transport by road 
network is everyday threat for population and 
environment close roads which are being used for 
these transports. Despite of respecting of all 
regulations there always exists possibility of 
technical failures, crashes and malfunctions. For 
elimination of these risks an information system for 
the monitoring of the dangerous good transport was 
developed [1]. This system uses standard 
communication technologies GPS (Global Position 
System), GSM/GPRS (Global System for Mobile 
Communications / General Packet Radio Service) 
and CAN (Controller Area Network). Non-
detectable corruption of transferred data in vehicle 
sensor network or during transmission into 
monitoring centre can cause people’s health damage, 
material damage or environment damage. For these 
reasons the system must be designed to guarantee 
required safety integrity level (SIL). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.Basic components of information system for 
monitoring of dangerous good transport 
 
Therefore the control of dangerous good 
transport would be classified as safety-critical 
process control and the system would be designed in 
accordance with safety standards by which the safety 
requirements for elimination of risks must be 
classified. The safety index together with reliability, 
lifetime, readiness, no-failure operation, capability 
and feasibility of maintenance is a part of technical 
quality care which must be monitored in whole 
system life cycle. 
 
2. SYSTEM CONCEPTION FOR 
MANAGING AND MONITORING OF 
DANGEROUS GOOD TRANSPORTS 
BASED ON STANDARD 
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS 
 Main part of system is mobile on-board unit 
with network of sensors which monitor status of 
dangerous good and monitoring centre which 
evaluates information from OBUs. In critical 
situation the monitoring centre sends actual data to 
rescue system (Fig. 1). Communication among 
individual components of system is based on well 
known communication standards GPS, GSM/GPRS 
and CAN. Basic requirements for this information 
system are: 
• to provide information about dangerous good 
and manipulation rules with its, 
• real time monitoring of dangerous good status, 
• detection of non-authorized manipulation with 
dangerous good, 
• voice and data connection with rescue system in 
case of damage or accident. 
OBU consists of the control unit, the 
communication subsystem and the sensor network. 
Control and communication unit is based on the 
single board industrial PC of EPIC form (Embedded 
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Platform for Industrial Computing). Type of EPIC 
module is NANO-9452 and it is product of IEI 
Technology Corp., Taiwan. The CAN interface is 
interconnected with EPIC module by internal 
PC/104+ bus and it creates interface between OBU 
and sensor network (Fig. 2). The sensors for 
measuring / sensing of temperature, gas 
concentration, pressure, vehicle inclination and glass 
break have been developed [2, 3]. 
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of OBU 
 
3. POSSIBILITIES FOR SAFE AND SECURE 
COMMUNICATION 
The standard communication buses and 
information networks without additional technical 
solutions are unusable for safety related critical data 
transfer, although they contain the basic methods for 
data integrity checking eventually other security 
mechanisms, too. From data transfer safety point of 
view such communication systems are marked as 
untrusted “black channels”. 
For analysis and synthesis of the safety 
related communication system in its lifecycle the 
modelling is being used. The results of the 
modelling are mostly used in pre-manufacturing 
phases of system lifecycle (specification of system 
requirements, design and construction) but also in 
the case of intervention into existing system, after 
repairs or at extension of safety functionality. The 
most significant method in automotive industry is 
analysis of the possible failures and their 
consequences (FMEA - Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis). The results of this analysis are 
identification of all serious types of the fault states 
(failures, defects etc.) and their evaluation, sorting 
by importance and the proposals for possibilities of 
corrections. 
 
4. SAFE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL 
FOR SENSOR NETWORK 
The solution of the safety communication 
profile for sensor network based on CAN bus in 
vehicle OBU can be realized in two ways: 
• design of new communication profile based on 
the safety fieldbus principles, 
• improvement of existing technical solution by 
adding of the safety functions into 
communication system, whereby safety integrity 
level SIL will be increased from SIL 0 to the 
required value. 
Note: Current highest required SIL level in majority 
of industrial application is SIL 3. 
Authors incline to the second solution 
which does not violate original hardware design of 
OBU. The improvements are realized only in 
software of OBU by extending of communication 
protocol by safety related communication layer SCL 
(Safety Communication Layer). The placement of 
SCL in safety related communication protocol 
Fieldbus in accordance to standard IEC 61784-3 [5] 
is shown in the Fig. 3 over application layer. The 
physical, data link and application layers represent 
safety integrity level SIL 0 and SCL layer represents 
SIL 1 to SIL 4 following the number and force of 
implemented safety mechanisms. 
This solution is compatible with existing 
and installed CAN bus network and is common for 
the standard and the safety related sensors [10, 11]. 
It allows safety relevant and safety irrelevant data 
transfer by the same bus with independent functions 
for the standard and the safety relevant end 
equipment. 
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Fig. 3. Proposal of safety sensor network 
 
CAN communication protocol used in OBU 
is equivalent to physical and data link layers of 
DeviceNet protocol. Therefore the suitable solution 
for the sensor network is CPF2 (Communication 
Profile Family) based on CIP Safety which is 
extension of CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) [9]. 
CIP Safety protocol is approved by TÜV Rheinland 
(Germany) for communication among safety 
relevant equipments which have to guarantee the 
SIL 3 level. Assortment of selected safety 
mechanisms would be selected in accordance with 
analysis of possible attacks on data transfer by 
untrusted bus. The full matrix of the communication 
errors and the associated safety mechanisms is given 
in Table 1. 
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Tab. 1. Recommended matrix of errors and protections for CIP Safety 
 
5. SECURE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL 
OF GSM/GPRS NETWORK 
For transfer of traffic information into 
monitoring centre the GSM/GPRS network has been 
selected. This network can be classified in 
accordance with standard [4] as untrusted 
transmission system with safety integrity level SIL 0 
and in accordance with [7] as class 6 or 7 of 
transmission system openness. This system without 
the modification is not suitable for transferring of 
the safety related data where traffic information 
appertains, too. The authors recommend to go out 
from the attack analysis and the secure services 
definitions in accordance with recommendation 
ITU-T X.800 “Security architecture for Open 
System Interconnection for CCITT applications” [8] 
when designing the secure mechanisms for transfer 
of traffic information into the monitoring centre. The 
typical attacks which must be taken into account in 
GSM/GPRS networks are the following: 
• insertion of false information, 
• insertion of older messages, 
• change of information during transfer, 
• delay of information, 
• loss of information, 
• attack on end station, 
• attack with communication protocol. 
 The secure services according to X.800 [8] 
can be implemented into various layers of ISO/OSI 
model and can be divided into several groups: 
• authentication services verify an identity of one 
or both communicating sides, 
• access control services protect against non 
authorized access to resources of distributed 
system, 
• confidentiality assurance services protect 
against non authorized revealing, 
• integrity assurance services protect transferred 
information against non authorized 
modification, 
• undeniable responsibility services assure 
possibility to prove of transmission / reception 
of message to other side i. e. to disable 
possibility of message transmission / reception 
disclaiming. 
 The selected safety functions could be 
preferentially applied in application layer of 
ISO/OSI model, or in network eventually in 
transport layer. Secure services are recommended to 
use with these security mechanisms: cryptographic 
protection of confidentiality and integrity, 
authentication, access control, digital signature, 
message transfer control, message encapsulation and 
notarial services. 
In the case of the packet transmission (used 
in GSM/GPRS network) the simplest solution is 
utilization of secure versions of TCP/IP protocols 
(IPsec, SSL, TLS) and creation of secure VPN 
(Virtual Private Network) tunnel. Recommended 
configuration of VPN using IPsec protocol between 
vehicle and monitoring centre is shown in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Proposal of secure communication channel 
between vehicle and monitoring centre across VPN tunnel 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 The next possibilities of OBU development 
should have focused on the implementation of the 
new functions so that in the future the trucks can be 
operated with one multifunctional OBU only. The 
developed OBU after potential addition of the 
suitable modules (connected via sensor network) is 
able to perform more functions which are performed 
by the individual OBU nowadays, for example: 
• navigation system, 
SAFETY MECHANISMS COMMUNICATION 
ERRORS Time stamp Identification of 
sender and recipient 
Safety CRC 
code 
Redundancy with 
cross check 
Other 
Repetition X  X*   
Loss X  X*   
Insertion X X X*   
Change of order X  X*   
Corruption   X X  
Delay X     
Combination of SR/SR 
data 
 X    
Combination of 
SR/SNR data 
X X X X X 
Errors of switches X     
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• electronic toll collection, 
• digital tachograph, 
• logistic support. 
 In addition to the technical development of 
the information system for dangerous good transport 
monitoring the questions about standardization and 
legislative are interested, for example the 
standardization of sensors in vehicles, integration of 
the various functions into OBU, the international 
cooperation on dangerous good monitoring etc. 
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